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Let’s Reinvent the Wheel: The Internet as a Means of 
Interstate Commerce in United States v. Kieffer* 
I. Introduction 
We have crossed the mountain and seen the Pacific. Well, we have seen 
the Internet, and like the discovery of the Pacific, the Internet has brought 
with it an expansion of the world as we know it and a host of uncharted 
territory. The Internet is everywhere, and it is a vital part of our lives. It is 
accessed in our houses, our computers, our cell phones, our televisions, our 
cars, and our local Starbucks. In May of 2013, the United States Census 
Bureau released a report stating that in 2011, 71.7% of households reported 
accessing the Internet.1 This represents an increase of more than 50% in 
less than twenty years.2 We use the Internet to shop, to conduct research, to 
entertain ourselves, and to stay connected with our family and friends. It 
has revolutionized the way in which we live our lives. So what harm, if any, 
can come from it? Unfortunately, the Internet has also influenced the way 
we commit crimes. For example, it is no longer necessary to physically 
steal money from an individual; simply hack the person’s email and prey 
upon his unsuspecting contact list through pleas for help.3  
In the wake of this new generation of criminals, the justice system is left 
scrambling in its attempts to apply Internet use in the commission of a 
crime to the existing criminal statutory framework.4 Each federal criminal 
statute has an interstate commerce nexus (Interstate Nexus) requirement 
                                                                                                                 
 * Many individuals deserve thanks for their work on this Note, but I would like to 
thank two of you in particular. First, thank you to Assistant United States Attorney Scott 
Williams for the research project and legal genius that inspired this Note—it would not have 
been born without you. Second, thank you to Professor and mentor Murray Tabb for your 
brainstorming sessions, editing expertise, and serenity throughout this process. 
 1. Thom File, Computer and Internet Use in the United States: Population 
Characteristics, CENSUS.GOV 1, 1 (2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-569. 
pdf.  
 2. Id. at 1 (reporting 18% in 1997). 
 3. Elisabeth Leamy & Sally Hawkins, ‘Stranded Traveler’ Scam Hacks Victims’ 
Emails, Asks Their Contacts for Money, ABC NEWS (July 13, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Technology/stranded-traveler-scam-hacks-victims-emails-asks-contacts/story?id=16774896.  
 4. See, e.g., Nathaniel H. Clark, Comment, Tangled in a Web: The Difficulty of 
Regulating Intrastate Internet Transmissions Under the Interstate Commerce Clause, 40 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 947, 948-49 (2009); Michael D. Yanovsky Sukenik, Distinct Words, 
Discrete Meanings: The Internet & Illicit Interstate Commerce, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & 
POL’Y 1, 2. 
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that delineates the extent to which Congress has the power to regulate. For 
example, in the federal wire fraud statute, which includes schemes to 
defraud via the Internet, Congress may regulate, and the Executive may 
prosecute, wire fraud crimes that occur “in interstate . . . commerce.”5 As 
the phrase suggests, the Interstate Nexus requires that the crime occur “in 
interstate,” which traditionally requires that the communication cross state 
lines.6 However, as we shall see, the Internet is not quite as simple as 
mailing a letter to another state, which must cross state lines. In fact, 
depending on the where the Internet servers are located, the Internet 
connection may cross state lines, or it may not.7 
This fact has left the judiciary in quite a conundrum. Should the courts 
expand a nearly all-encompassing commerce clause power and assume the 
Internet has crossed state lines in every case? Or should the courts limit the 
expanse of the Commerce Clause and require prosecutors to show the 
connection crossed state lines, as some federal statutes require? Without 
fail, this question has caused numerous disagreements among courts.8 Two 
of the best examples that demonstrate this pattern of disagreement are the 
federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343,9 and the federal child 
pornography statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 225210 and 2252A.11 Decisions 
interpreting these statutes exemplify how a common phrase, such as “in 
interstate commerce,” can be interpreted in very different ways.12 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has yet to address these varied 
interpretations and applications of the Internet to interstate commerce.13 
Furthermore, Congress has only addressed this issue as it pertains to the 
child pornography statutes.14 
The Tenth Circuit recently became the second court to address this issue 
in United States v. Kieffer.15 The court asked whether the use of the Internet 
inherently satisfies the Interstate Nexus under the federal wire fraud 
                                                                                                                 
 5. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). 
 6. See infra Part IV.A. 
 7. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 8. See, e.g., infra Part II.A. 
 9. 18 U.S.C. § 1343. 
 10. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012). 
 11. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2012). For the purposes of this Note, 18 U.S.C. § 2252 and § 
2252A will be considered interchangeably.  
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.  
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. 681 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 996 (2013). 
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statute.16 Unfortunately, its answer simply perpetuates the status quo. In this 
case, the court properly affirmed the conviction of Defendant Kieffer, and 
upheld the principle that the government must show that the Internet 
connection crossed state lines in order to prosecute.17 However, the Tenth 
Circuit’s opinion did little to settle the federal courts’ dispute regarding this 
issue. Complicating matters, the Tenth Circuit’s position directly 
contradicts the only other court to address the Internet and wire fraud, the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.18 
Finally, this case only further divides the federal courts in their attempts to 
understand and apply criminal statutes in the context of Internet use.  
In light of the prolonged disagreement, this Note addresses the need for 
resolution. The Internet is a pervasive part of our lives and as a legal 
community, we cannot afford to allow such disparate treatment of the 
Internet with respect to criminal statutes.19 Part II addresses the Internet and 
interstate commerce conflict prior to United States v. Kieffer, particularly 
the circuit split surrounding the child pornography statutes, and how that 
conflict mirrors the current interpretive conflict regarding wire fraud. Parts 
III and IV analyze Defendant Kieffer’s conviction of wire fraud—
specifically the Tenth Circuit’s articulation of a standard for applying 
commerce clause principles to Kieffer’s use of the Internet in the 
commission of his crime. Part V then argues that although the Tenth Circuit 
properly affirmed the conviction of Defendant Kieffer and upheld the 
correct standard in applying interstate commerce principles to the Internet, 
its decision had a much further reaching impact than the court intended. 
Finally, Part VI proposes a new, uniform standard of applying the 
Commerce Clause to the Internet—a single standard which the Supreme 
Court and Congress can apply to all criminal statutes.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 16. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). While the Tenth Circuit in Kieffer is the first 
circuit to decide this issue, a district court weighed in on whether the Internet satisfies § 
1343’s Interstate Nexus prior to Kieffer. United States v. Fumo, No. 06-319, 2009 WL 
1688482 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2009). 
 17. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1153.  
 18. Compare id. at 1155 (holding that the wire fraud statute’s commerce phrase, “in 
interstate . . . commerce,” requires the prosecution to prove the Internet transmission crossed 
state lines), with Fumo, 2009 WL 1688482, at *9 (holding wire fraud’s “in interstate 
commerce” does not require proof that an Internet transmission crossed state lines). 
 19. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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II. Save the Kids: The Internet, Interstate Commerce, and Child 
Pornography Before United States v. Kieffer  
United States v. Kieffer is by no means the only decision to discuss the 
relationship between the Internet and the Commerce Clause as it pertains to 
other criminal statutes.20 Two statutes in particular, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 
2252A (together, the child pornography statutes), punish individuals for 
conduct involving child pornography. These statutes demonstrate the 
tension among the federal courts in their attempts to interpret commerce 
clause principles as applied to the Internet. The following section details the 
differences in judicial interpretation of the child pornography statutes 
resulting in a circuit split, which foreshadows the interpretive conflict 
surrounding the wire fraud statute.  
A. Fighting over the Internet and Child Pornography 
Congress passed The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation 
Act (Child Pornography Act) in 1977.21 The Act created the criminal 
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252,22 and Congress later amended the Act to create 
18 U.S.C. § 2252A.23 Both statutes had, and still have, the same 
jurisdictional requirements.24 When enacted, each statute criminalized 
transporting, shipping, distributing, or receiving child pornography in 
interstate commerce.25 Despite the statute’s seemingly straightforward 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Liton, 311 F. App’x 300, 301 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(interpreting the Interstate Nexus of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)); United States v. Agarwal, 314 F. 
App’x 473, 475 (3d Cir. 2008) (interpreting the Interstate Nexus of 18 U.S.C. § 
1028(c)(3)(A)); United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 243-46 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(interpreting the Interstate Nexus of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B)).  
 21. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 (1996).  
 24. Compare Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, § 2, 92 
Stat. at 7 (“in interstate . . . commerce”), and Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act § 
121 (“in interstate . . . commerce”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (2012) (“in or affecting 
interstate . . . commerce”), and 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) (2012) (“in or affecting 
interstate . . . commerce”).  
 25. 92 Stat. 7; 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1)-(2) (2012). Both statutes make it a crime to 
transport, ship, receive, or distribute child pornography; however, § 2252 places more 
specific requirements on the type of visual depiction that constitutes child pornography, 
among other differences irrelevant for the purposes of this Note. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 
2252(a)(1)-(2), with 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1)-(2). Therefore, these statutes will be used 
interchangeably for the purposes of this Note. 
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language—“in interstate . . . commerce”—the proliferation of the Internet 
in the twenty-first century has confounded federal courts attempting to 
apply that language to child pornography cases. This confusion created a 
circuit split between the federal courts.  
On one side of the split, the Tenth Circuit determined the child 
pornography statute required that the prosecutor prove the Internet 
communication crossed state lines.26 On the other side are the circuits that 
held the mere use of the Internet satisfied the Interstate Nexus under the 
statute.27 These include the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits.28 The Third 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. MacEwan represents the most recent 
and cumulative opinion in this line of cases.29   
1. United States v. MacEwan: The Internet Is Interstate Commerce 
In this recent Third Circuit decision, the defendant, James MacEwan, 
was charged with three counts of receiving materials containing child 
pornography under the Child Pornography Act.30 These counts were based 
on the defendant’s conduct, which included multiple visits to child 
pornography websites containing graphic images of child sexual 
exploitation.31 At trial, the defendant argued the court did not have 
jurisdiction because the government failed to prove he transported the 
pornographic images across state lines.32 He further argued that absent 
proof of interstate transmission, it was just as likely the images had traveled 
intrastate, and therefore, his conduct fell outside of the purview of the 
Commerce Clause.33  
In response, the government offered expert testimony from the manager 
of the defendant’s Internet service provider, who described a process called 
                                                                                                                 
 26. United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007), overruled by 
United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2012).  
 27. See United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 243-45 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[O]nce a user 
submits a connection request to a website server or an image is transmitted from the website 
server back to user, the data has traveled in interstate commerce.”); United States v. 
Machtley, 163 F. App’x 837, 838-39 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 
223, 239 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 28. See supra note 27. 
 29. 445 F.3d 237. 
 30. Id. at 240. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 241. 
 33. Id. 
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the “Shortest Path First.”34 The process is part of the interaction between 
the flow of data and an Internet connection.35 The expert testified that when 
an individual attempts to access a website, the connection required to access 
the website starts in the individual’s computer and then transfers to the 
cable modem in the individual’s house.36 From the modem, the connection 
travels to a regional data center, which processes the individual’s request to 
access the website through various routers located in the regional data 
center.37 Once the regional data center processes the request, the website 
request is sent to the Internet backbone, a framework of lines that sends the 
website request to the server containing the website.38 As it travels through 
the Internet backbone to the website server, the Internet connection will 
take the “Shortest Path First.”39 This means, from the regional data center, 
the website request travels along a line with the least amount of Internet 
traffic, as opposed to the shortest geographical distance.40 Therefore, if the 
individual’s computer and the website server are located within the same 
state, the website connection will typically (but not necessarily) travel 
intrastate, and if the computer and website server are in different states, the 
connection will always travel interstate.41  
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court by holding that regardless of 
whether the pornographic images originated in the same state as the 
individual accessing the images, the mere fact the defendant allegedly 
downloaded the images satisfied the interstate jurisdictional nexus.42 The 
court concluded that, because the Internet was “inexorably intertwined with 
interstate commerce,” it was an instrumentality and channel of interstate 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. “Shortest Path First” means the Internet connection travels along the line with 
the least volume of traffic. Id. Therefore, while the individual’s computer and the website 
server are located within the same state, if the Internet backbone in a particular state has a 
high volume of traffic, the Internet backbone will automatically transfer the connection to 
another line with a lower volume of Internet traffic, and the line with less Internet traffic 
could be located in another state. See id. at 241-42. 
 35. Id. at 241. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.; see also supra note 34 and commentary.  
 42. MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 243-44.  
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commerce, which Congress has the ability to regulate.43 Therefore, the 
federal government had jurisdiction to prosecute the defendant.44 
2. United States v. Schaefer and the Circuit Split: The Internet 
Connection Must Cross State Lines 
While MacEwan represented the holding of the circuit courts at that 
time, the following year, the Tenth Circuit created a circuit split in its 
opinion, United States v. Schaefer.45 A federal court convicted Defendant 
William Schaefer of receiving and possessing child pornography under the 
Child Pornography Act.46 Like MacEwan, Schaefer argued on appeal that 
the government had not produced sufficient evidence to satisfy the statute’s 
Interstate Nexus requirement.47 He claimed the statute’s Interstate Nexus 
requirements (in interstate commerce) necessitated that the government 
show he caused the Internet transmission of the pornographic images to 
cross state lines.48 Therefore, Schaefer concluded, the government’s 
showing that his use of the Internet in the commission of the crime was 
insufficient to satisfy the Interstate Nexus.49  
Contrary to the weight of the other circuits, the Tenth Circuit agreed with 
the defendant and held that, although the Internet connection involves 
movement between states in most instances, it does not remove the need for 
the government to provide evidence of interstate movement.50 In reaching 
its decision, the court analyzed prior case law, as well as the statute, 
specifically noting Congress’s ability to limit its powers under the 
Commerce Clause.51 
In its statutory analysis, the court focused on the phrase “in 
commerce.”52 It found the statute’s use of “in commerce” instead of 
“affecting commerce” signaled Congress’s intent to limit federal 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at 245-46 (citing United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 
2004) (“Congress clearly has the power to regulate the [I]nternet, as it does other 
instrumentalities . . . of interstate commerce . . . .”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
558 (1995) (holding Congress has the power to regulate the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce even though the wrongful conduct may occur wholly intrastate)). 
 44. Id. at 246. 
 45. 501 F.3d 1197 (2007). 
 46. Id. at 1199.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 1200-01.  
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 1201.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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jurisdiction because the latter exerts Congress’s full Commerce Clause 
power, whereas the former signals a limitation.53 In light of this 
interpretation, the court then rejected the other circuits’ approaches based 
on a “cursory inspection” of the case law.54 The court declined to analyze 
United States v. Runyan,55 a Fifth Circuit case that held it was sufficient for 
the government to “make a specific connection between the [pornographic] 
images introduced at trial and the Internet” to satisfy the statute’s Interstate 
Nexus.56 It refused to apply United States v. Carroll because Carroll did 
not analyze the same statute as the statute at issue.57 Finally, the court 
rejected MacEwan’s analysis because the MacEwan court neglected to 
analyze the Interstate Nexus phrase “in commerce” as it applied to the 
statute’s jurisdiction.58 The court concluded by reasserting its position that 
the Child Pornography Act did not include an “Internet exception” that 
would waive the government’s burden to prove interstate movement.59 This 
holding drove a wedge between the circuits, and highlighted that a uniform 
judicial application the Commerce Clause to the use of the Internet has 
proven problematic. 
But the circuit split created by Schaefer did not last long. Immediately 
following the decision in Schaefer, Congress rectified the split by passing 
the Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007.60  
3. Congress Leaves the Tenth Circuit Out in the Cold 
In passing this new legislation, Congress expressly adopted the position 
of the majority of the circuits and struck down what it deemed an erroneous 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. at 1201-02 (citing Russel v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 (1985) 
(“‘[A]ffecting interstate or foreign commerce’ conveys Congress’s intent to exert full 
Commerce Clause power . . . .”)); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115-16 
(2001) (holding “in commerce” limits Congress’s reach)). 
 54. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1203-04 (citing United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 244 
(3d Cir. 2006)) (holding proof of downloading pornographic images from the Internet was 
sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional nexus); United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 242 
(5th Cir. 2002) (holding the government must provide a connection between the images 
introduced as evidence and the Internet to satisfy the jurisdictional nexus); United States v. 
Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 742 (1st Cir. 1997) (transmitting photographs using the Internet is 
moving them through interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a))).  
 55. Id. at 1204-05. 
 56. Runyan, 290 F.3d at 242.  
 57. Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1204-05. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 1205.  
 60. Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, H.R. 4120, 110th Cong. 
(2008).  
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holding by the Tenth Circuit.61 The new legislation amended the interstate 
commerce element of §§ 2252 and 2252A to include “in or affecting 
interstate” or foreign commerce.62 By including “affecting” in the 
jurisdictional requirements, Congress guaranteed that use of the Internet, 
standing alone, would satisfy the Interstate Nexus under the child 
pornography statutes.63 To justify amending the statute, Congress cited 
specific findings that built upon its original concerns from 1977—
specifically, that child pornography was “estimated to be a multibillion 
dollar industry of global proportions” which amounted to a “permanent 
record of a child’s abuse.”64 Furthermore, Congress included findings about 
the nature of the Internet in relation to interstate commerce, namely, that 
“[t]he Internet is well recognized as a method of distributing goods and 
services across State lines,” and “[t]he transmission of child pornography 
using the Internet constitutes transportation in interstate commerce.”65  
Although Congress settled the circuit split in applying interstate 
commerce requirements to the Internet for the purpose of the child 
pornography statute, the federal courts continue to struggle when 
defendants use the Internet in the commission of other federal crimes. In 
fact, this battle was doomed to repeat when the courts again squared off 
over this issue a mere five years later.66 
B. Wire Fraud and the Internet Before Kieffer 
Despite the apparent resolution obtained through congressional 
intervention in interpreting the Interstate Nexuses of the child pornography 
statutes, the courts once again struggle to answer the question of whether 
use of the Internet alone satisfies Interstate Nexus requirements; this time, 
in regards to wire fraud. Similar to the original versions of the Child 
Pornography act, the jurisdiction requirement for wire fraud requires that 
the communication(s) in support of the wire fraud scheme occur in 
interstate commerce.67 The interpretative dispute began when the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania became the 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See generally, Sukenik, supra note 4, at 14.  
 62. H.R. 4120 § 103(b) (emphasis added); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2252A (2012).  
 63. See, e.g., supra note 53.  
 64. Act of Oct. 8, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 102, 122 Stat. 4001, 4001.   
 65. Id.  
 66. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).  
 67. Id.  
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first court to affirm that the use of the Internet satisfies the Interstate Nexus 
for wire fraud.68  
In United States v. Fumo, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania convicted 
Defendant Vincent Fumo on 137 counts related to fraud and conspiracy to 
defraud the Pennsylvania Senate, the Citizens Alliance for Better 
Neighborhoods, and the Internal Revenue Service, as well as fraud relating 
to the Independence Seaport Museum.69 Twelve of the 137 charges were 
charges of wire fraud.70 Upon conviction the defendant filed a motion for 
judgment on acquittal and a motion for new trial.71 Regarding the wire 
fraud counts, the defendant argued the government did not provide 
substantial evidence to show the emails he sent in furtherance of the wire 
fraud scheme traveled in interstate commerce.72 Specifically, the defendant 
argued the emails never traveled outside of Pennsylvania, the defendant’s 
state of residence.73 
In its decision, the district court cited United States v. Lopez and United 
States v. MacEwan to support its holding that Internet use alone satisfied 
the jurisdictional nexus for wire fraud.74 The court reiterated the holding in 
Lopez, which articulated that Congress has the authority to regulate 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce and activities with a substantial 
relationship to interstate commerce, despite the fact that those activities 
may occur entirely intrastate.75 In addition, the court adopted the ruling in 
MacEwan which held that “nothing in the statute required that the images 
crossed state lines.”76 Further, because the fluctuations in Internet traffic 
could result in the “Shortest Path First” traveling across state lines before 
connecting with the website server, it was sufficient for the purposes of 
interstate commerce that the emails in conjunction with the scheme were 
sent and received through the Internet.77 The court concluded that “[t]o hold 
otherwise would conflat[e] interstate commerce with interstate transmission 
                                                                                                                 
 68. United States v. Fumo, No. 06-319, 2009 WL 1688482, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 
2009). 
 69. Id. at *1. 
 70. Id. at *1, *3.  
 71. Id. at *1. 
 72. Id. at *3.  
 73. Id. at *8. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)).  
 76. Id. (citing United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2006)).  
 77. Id. at *8-9; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
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and confuse the nature of the jurisdictional basis for [the] charged 
offense.”78 
The Fumo Court remained true to the weight of precedent which 
established that Internet use, standing alone, was sufficient to satisfy the 
Interstate Nexus of criminal statutes, even statutes that required the illegal 
activity to occur in interstate commerce. Uniformity, however, was short-
lived.  
III. Statement of the Case 
Rather than yield to the majority, the Tenth Circuit seized an opportunity 
to upend consensus with its opinion in Kieffer. With Kieffer, the court 
reestablished its belief that, when it comes to the Internet and conduct “in 
interstate commerce,” the government must show the Internet 
communication or transmission crossed state lines.79 
A. The Tale of an “Attorney”  
Though Defendant Howard Kieffer did not possess a license to practice 
law, had not attended law school, and had not  passed the bar, he obtained 
authorization to practice law in North Dakota, Minnesota, Colorado, and 
the Western District of Missouri.80 In fact, Kieffer was a successful 
nation-wide criminal law attorney based in Santa Ana, California.81 
Moreover, Kieffer awarded himself the title of Executive Director of the 
Federal Defense Associates and advertised his practice via websites, legal 
conferences, and professional contacts.82 His career as an attorney came to 
a halt in 2009, when a disgruntled client wrote to the District of North 
Dakota court clerk and claimed that Kieffer was not an attorney.83 
Kieffer’s lack of a legal license initiated federal prosecution in North 
Dakota, charging him with mail fraud and making false statements about 
his “legal practice.”84 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Fumo, 2009 WL 1688482, at *8-9 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting MacEwan, 
445 F.3d at 243).  
 79. United States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1155 (10th Cir. 2012).  
 80. Id. at 1146. Defendant Kieffer originally gained admission to the District of North 
Dakota by making a materially false application to the court. Id. Using his successful 
admission to North Dakota, Defendant then gained admission in the District of Minnesota, 
District of Colorado, and the Western District of Missouri. Id. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 1147-50. 
 83. United States v. Kieffer, 621 F.3d 825, 830 (8th Cir. 2010).  
 84. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1146. 
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In October of 2007, approximately two years before Kieffer’s conviction 
in North Dakota, Stephen Bergman retained Kieffer to represent his sister, 
Gwen Bergman, in a criminal case brought against her in the District of 
Colorado.85 Kieffer was hired to replace Ms. Bergman’s then counsel, 
Edward Pluss, a federal public defender.86 Stephen became aware of Kieffer 
after viewing his website, www.boplaw.com.87 At the time Stephen 
contacted Kieffer, Ms. Bergman was in federal prison and receiving 
treatment for a mental condition.88 In fact, it was Ms. Bergman’s status in 
prison that led Stephen to contact and hire Kieffer based on representations 
from www.boplaw.com and other websites that Kieffer was particularly 
accomplished at Bureau of Prison conflicts.89  
Kieffer commenced his representation of Ms. Bergman at a competency 
hearing, followed by Ms. Bergman’s bench trial several months later where 
the district court found her guilty of solicitation to commit murder, as well 
as conspiracy to commit murder for hire.90 To complicate matters, just after 
Ms. Bergman’s trial, Kieffer received an order from the District of North 
Dakota to show cause as to the truth of statements Kieffer made on his 
application to practice in that district.91 Around the same time, a reporter 
from the Denver Post called Stephen Bergman, and their conversation 
caused Mr. Bergman to question whether Kieffer was a licensed attorney.92 
By then, Stephen had paid Kieffer $65,750 for representing Ms. Bergman, 
even taking out a second mortgage on his home to afford the cost.93 
Kieffer’s time as an attorney, however, would shortly come to an end.  
This series of events not only precipitated Kieffer’s criminal charges in 
North Dakota and his subsequent conviction, but also led to Kieffer’s 
indictment in the District of Colorado on three charges: wire fraud, making 
false statements, and contempt of court.94 Kieffer’s charge of making a false 
statement was based on his false representation that he was a licensed 
attorney in the District of Columbia, which he used to gain admission to the 
District of Colorado.95 The contempt-of-court charge was based on the fact 
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 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 1150. 
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 89. Id.  
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 92. Id. 
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 94. Id. at 1151-52. 
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that Kieffer “jeopardized the administration of justice” when he lied to the 
court clerk about his status as an attorney and then proceeded to represent a 
criminal defendant before the court.96 Finally, the basis of Kieffer’s wire 
fraud charge was the fact he used his professional website, 
www.boplaw.com, to support and advertise his unlawful practice of law 
and to defraud Stephen Bergman of thousands of dollars.97 Shortly after the 
indictment, a federal petit jury found Kieffer guilty on all three counts.98 
Kieffer subsequently appealed his conviction to the Tenth Circuit. 
B. On Appeal to the Tenth Circuit 
Kieffer raised three main arguments on appeal to the Tenth Circuit. This 
Note focuses on the issue of whether or not the government sufficiently 
established that Kieffer’s communication through his website satisfied the 
Interstate Nexus for the wire fraud statute. Although Kieffer’s remaining 
issues on appeal will not be considered in depth, they are worth briefly 
mentioning. For his first issue on appeal, Kieffer argued he should receive a 
judgment of acquittal on the wire fraud count because the government 
failed to prove all elements of the offense.99 He based this argument on the 
fact that the government did not show that his Internet communications 
traveled in interstate commerce or that the communications were used to 
execute a scheme to defraud.100 Kieffer’s remaining issues on appeal 
consisted of a claim that the jury was erroneously instructed on reasonable 
doubt,101 as well as five separate challenges to his sentencing.102 The Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the lower court on Kieffer’s first three issues on appeal, 
but ruled in his favor on the sentencing issues.103   
In ruling on Kieffer’s wire fraud challenge, the Tenth Circuit held that 
the government provided sufficient evidence to show that Kieffer’s Internet 
communications crossed state lines, and therefore, satisfied the Interstate 
Nexus requirement under § 1343.104 The following section will discuss the 
Tenth Circuit’s analysis in determining that Kieffer caused his Internet 
communications to cross state lines. In addition, the section will address the 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 1152.  
 99. Id. at 1147.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1160, 1170-72.  
 104. Id. at 1155.  
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circuit’s affirmation of its holding in United States v. Schaefer, specifically, 
that a defendant’s “use of the [I]nternet, ‘standing alone,’ does not establish 
an interstate [nexus].”105 
IV. Adding to the Conundrum: Deciding United States v. Kieffer 
To determine whether the government offered sufficient evidence to 
show that the Internet communications through Kieffer’s website had 
crossed state lines, the Tenth Circuit looked at a variety of factors, 
including the plain language of the rule and the applicability of case law.106 
And, in addition to deciding the issue on appeal, the court briefly concluded 
its opinion by resurrecting the holding from United States v. Schaefer and 
applying that doctrine to the federal wire fraud statute.107  
A. Statute and Case Law 
As its first step, the court turned to the language of the wire fraud statute 
to determine whether it required the government to show a defendant’s 
internet connection crossed state lines.108 Under the statute, an individual 
commits the crime of wire fraud if that person “transmits or causes to be 
transmitted by means of wire, [or] radio . . . communication in interstate . . . 
commerce.”109 Based on this wording, the court found the statute required 
the government to show that Kieffer used interstate wire or wireless 
communications in the execution of his scheme to defraud.110 And it was 
that requirement, Kieffer argued, that the government failed to meet.111 
Kieffer claimed that the government had not offered evidence to show 
interstate movement between Kieffer’s website, where he advertised his 
legal services, and the victim, Stephen Bergman, who hired Kieffer based 
on representations made on the website.112 
In support of his argument, Kieffer cited one case, Schaefer.113 He 
compared the child pornography statute at issue in Schaefer114 with the 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Id. (citing United States v. Vigil, 523 F.3d 1258, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008)); see also 
supra Part II.A.2. 
 106. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1152-55.  
 107. Id. at 1155.  
 108. Id. at 1153.  
 109. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (emphasis added).  
 110. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1152. 
 111. Id.  
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 113. Id. at 1153.  
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federal wire fraud statute.115 At the time of Schaefer, both statutes required 
that the Internet transmission or communication used in the crime occur in 
interstate commerce.116 Kieffer sided with the Schaefer court and argued 
that to properly support a conviction, the language “in interstate . . . 
commerce” necessitated that the transmission actually cross state lines.117 In 
light of this standard, Kieffer argued that he should receive a judgment of 
acquittal because the government presented no evidence that the 
communication from the advertisement posted on his website to Mr. 
Bergman had crossed state lines.118 The Tenth Circuit, however, 
disagreed.119 
The court ruled that, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the government, a reasonable jury could conclude that the government’s 
evidence established the Interstate Nexus required under wire fraud.120 To 
articulate its holding, the court employed certain facts of the case to show 
that a juror could reasonably infer the transmission had crossed state 
lines.121 First, the court found that Kieffer controlled the website, 
www.boplaw.com, and therefore controlled the content of the site.122 In 
addition, Kieffer registered the domain name with Name Secure, a company 
owned and controlled by Network Solutions.123 The court noted that 
Network Solutions used a host server in Virginia, which facilitated the 
viewing of Kieffer’s website once the name was registered through 
Network Solutions.124 Finally, the court found that Stephen Bergman 
accessed boplaw.com from a computer in Colorado, and Edward Pluss125 
from a computer in Tennessee.126  
                                                                                                                 
 114. See supra Part II.A.2. Recall that at the time of Schaefer, the child pornography 
statute, § 2252, had not yet been amended to state “in or affecting interstate . . . commerce.” 
See United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1201-02 (2007); Effective Child Pornography 
Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-358, § 103, 122 Stat. 4001, 4002 (2008). 
 115. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1153.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. (citing Schaefer, 501 F.3d at 1202). 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 1153-54.  
 122. Id. at 1153. 
 123. Id. at 1154. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Following Kieffer’s entry of appearance to Ms. Bergman’s case, Mr. Pluss, Ms. 
Bergman’s Federal Public Defender, testified that he researched Kieffer. Id. at 1151. In the 
course of his research, Mr. Pluss encountered Kieffer’s website, boplaw.com. Id. Mr. Pluss 
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Using these facts, the court ruled that Kieffer caused content from his 
website to be transferred across state lines because the presence of 
individuals accessing the website in different states, along with nature of 
the Internet, allows for the inference that, absent evidence to the contrary, 
the same host server delivered the website’s content to both Colorado and 
Tennessee.127 The court based its ruling upon the satisfaction of two 
preconditions.128 First, Kieffer uploaded boplaw.com content to the 
website’s origin server located in any state.129 And second, the origin server 
transmitted the content across state lines to local servers.130 This second 
precondition necessitates that the origin server was located in Colorado (if 
Bergman’s computer accessed the content from Tennessee), Tennessee (if 
Pluss’s computer accessed the content from Colorado), or in a third state.131 
The court concluded that the presence of the origin server in one state and 
the host server in another state is sufficient to show that the transmission 
crossed state lines, and therefore, the government provided sufficient 
evidence to satisfy the Interstate Nexus.132  
In addition to holding that the government had sufficiently proven its 
case against Kieffer and satisfied the Interstate Nexus of § 1343, the Tenth 
Circuit attempted to rescue as much from its opinion in Schaefer as 
possible.133 
B. Salvaging Schaefer and its Ramifications 
From the beginning of its application of Schaefer to the issue at hand, the 
court noted its use of the opinion would be limited, even describing 
Schaefer as a “war-torn decision.”134 However, the court attempted to 
resurrect the opinion by reaffirming the narrow ruling that evidence of a 
defendant’s use of the Internet alone would not suffice as proof that an 
                                                                                                                 
also stated he believed Kieffer to be an attorney because Kieffer entered his appearance on 
Ms. Bergman’s case, as well as the representations made on Kieffer’s website. Id.  
 126. Id. at 1154.  
 127. Id. at 1154-55. 
 128. Id. at 1154.  
 129. Id. The Court noted the location of the host server was of no consequence because it 
ultimately reached individuals in two different states, allowing for the inference that the 
transmission of information from the website crossed state lines. See id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. (citing Akami Tech., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 
1186, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).  
 132. Id. at 1154-55.  
 133. Id. at 1153, 1155; see also supra Part II.A.2-3. 
 134. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1153.  
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Internet transmission traveled in interstate commerce.135 The court justified 
its affirmation of this holding on the basis of the nature of origin and host 
servers.136 More specifically, it noted the possibility that the origin and host 
server, if separate servers at all, could be located in the same state as the 
computer which accesses the website.137 Therefore, Schaefer would serve as 
a safeguard against instances in which a defendant should not be subject to 
federal prosecution because Internet transmission failed to cross state 
lines.138 
The Tenth Circuit’s affirmation of its holding from Schaefer reignites the 
conflict faced by the judiciary over the child pornography statutes. By 
upholding Schaefer, the court evidenced the legal community’s continuous 
struggle to apply the statute’s commerce clause requirements to the use of 
the Internet. However, unlike the split of authority over the child 
pornography statutes, Congress has remained silent on the issue of the 
Internet and wire fraud, as well as any other criminal statutes. And 
unfortunately, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to address the 
issue.139 With renewed deadlock between the courts as to the proper legal 
relationship between Internet use and interstate commerce, and with the 
Supreme Court and Congress’s lack of interest in resolving the dispute, it is 
unlikely that the conflict will end any time soon.  
V. Analysis: It’s Schaefer All Over Again 
The following sections of this Note serve three main purposes. First, they 
analyze the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Kieffer, showing that the court 
reached the correct decision when it held the government provided 
sufficient proof to show Kieffer’s Internet transmissions had crossed state 
lines. This is accomplished by a study of statutory interpretation, 
congressional intent, and relevant precedent. Second, they posit that the 
court’s dicta, stating it is necessary for the prosecution to show the 
transmission or communication crossed state lines, is not entirely proper 
and fails to move the legal community closer to a resolution on this 
pressing issue. Finally, this Note proposes a much-needed, unified standard 
and test from which to regulate the Internet as it relates to interstate 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. at 1155.  
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See, e.g., Kieffer v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 996 (2013) (denying certiorari); 
MacEwan v. United States, 549 U.S. 882 (2006) (same). 
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commerce. This new standard establishes a uniform basis that aids in 
solving the inconsistencies among the courts in their application of statutory 
commerce clause requirements to the use of the Internet, and eases 
confusion surrounding federal criminal jurisdiction for prosecutors and 
defendants alike.  
An analysis of the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Kieffer can be divided into 
three steps. These steps include an analysis of statutory interpretation, the 
nature of the Internet as applied to the case, and finally a discussion of the 
court’s belief that use of the Internet, standing alone, would not be 
satisfying proof of an interstate transmission or communication in interstate 
commerce. The Tenth Circuit was correct in affirming Kieffer’s wire fraud 
conviction and in holding that the government provided sufficient proof to 
establish that Kieffer’s Internet transmission crossed state lines. However, 
the court’s reiteration that the mere use of the Internet would not satisfy 
interstate commerce, although facially correct, does little to solve the 
conflict over the Internet and interstate commerce. 
When conducting its first task, the court acknowledged and accepted the 
requirement that an Internet transmission, as it pertains to wire fraud, must 
actually cross state lines to satisfy interstate commerce.140 And the court did 
so correctly. The language of the federal wire fraud statute reads that wire 
or wireless communications or transmissions made with the intent to 
defraud must occur in interstate commerce.141 Employment of the phrase 
“in [interstate] commerce” is acknowledged by the Supreme Court as 
evidence of Congress’s desire to limit federal jurisdiction.142 Based on 
accepted statutory interpretations of “in interstate commerce” and 
applicable case law, the Court, as well as Defendant Kieffer, appropriately 
determined it was necessary that the government show the interstate nature 
of Kieffer’s Internet transmissions.  
Next, based on the nature of the Internet and existing case law, the Court 
correctly determined that the government had provided sufficient evidence 
to show that Kieffer caused Internet transmissions from his website to cross 
state lines. Kieffer uploaded the content of his website to an origin server in 
a state different from the states in which the website was accessed by victim 
Stephen Berman and the Berman’s former attorney, Edward Pluss 
(Colorado and Tennessee respectively).143 The mere nature of the Internet 
supports the court’s conclusion that the transmission crossed state lines. As 
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https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss3/5
2015]       NOTE 607 
 
 
discussed in the Third Circuit’s United States v. MacEwan, if a computer 
that accesses a website (Bergman and Pluss) is located in a different state or 
states from the website server (Kieffer), the connection will travel 
interstate.144 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit correctly held that Kieffer’s 
Internet transmission crossed state lines.  
Before concluding its analysis regarding the wire fraud charge, the court 
took the opportunity to restate its belief that use of the Internet alone does 
not prove a transmission or communication occurred in interstate 
commerce.145 This dicta represents one side of the issue in the conflict over 
how to apply interstate commerce requirements to the use of the Internet in 
federal criminal statutes. That is, should use of the Internet alone satisfy the 
Interstate Nexus for criminal statutes, or should the government prove that 
Internet communication or transmissions actually crossed state lines before 
they are allowed to prosecute? The Tenth Circuit chose the latter.146 This 
answer is correct because use of the Internet alone should not satisfy the 
Interstate Nexus; however, the standard proposed by this Note argues the 
court is nevertheless incorrect.  
Kieffer and the conflict over the child pornography statutes represent the 
struggle of the courts to answer that question, and show that courts can take 
the same statute and the same language and answer the question very 
differently. The final section of this Note focuses on the inconsistent 
interpretations and applications of interstate commerce requirements to the 
use of the Internet in federal criminal statutes, proposes a standard and a 
test to alleviate those inconsistencies, and implores the Supreme Court and 
Congress to take action.   
VI. Reinventing the Wheel: A New Standard for the Internet and Interstate 
Commerce 
There is a definite and obvious need for a uniform standard when 
applying use of the Internet to the interstate commerce requirements of 
federal criminal statutes. This Part addresses that need by proposing a 
uniform standard, which could apply to all statutes. Instead of asking the 
courts to answer the question of whether use of the Internet alone satisfies 
the Interstate Nexus in all instances, or whether the government must 
                                                                                                                 
 144. See 445 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Akami Tech., Inc. v. Cable & 
Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1188-89 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (describing the 
relationship between host and origin servers’ interstate transmissions).  
 145. Kieffer, 681 F.3d at 1155.  
 146. Id. 
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provide proof that the Internet transmission crossed state lines, this Note 
proposes a standard that essentially combines those two answers into one. 
However, before embarking on an analysis of a new standard, a brief 
history of the Commerce Clause will provide insight into the source of the 
problem; that is, the courts’ long struggle to define the parameters of 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.147  
A. Clear as Mud: The Commerce Clause, United States v. Lopez, and its 
Ramifications 
 “[Congress shall have the power t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”148 To be 
sure, this is a considerable grant of power, and arguably the reason such 
conflict exists surrounding the federal courts’ attempts to fit Internet use 
into the existing interstate commerce requirements of the criminal statutes. 
After Gibbons v. Ogden,149 the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause 
precedent has flipped back and forth on how much and what kinds of 
commerce Congress is allowed to regulate.150 Although the Supreme Court 
employed a fairly broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause for several 
decades,151 the Court began reining in the breadth of the clause with United 
States v. Lopez.152 Not only did Lopez limit the scope of Congress’s power 
under the Commerce Clause, it provided a more detailed framework from 
which to analyze Congress’s power.  
                                                                                                                 
 147. Compare Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125-28 (1942) (interpreting the 
Commerce Clause as allowing Congress to regulate purely intrastate activities with 
substantial effect on interstate commerce), with United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 
(1995) (declining to allow Congress to regulate purely local, non-economic activity), and 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000) (rejecting congressional regulatory 
power based on an aggregation of local violent crime). 
 148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 149. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).  
 150. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding Congress can regulate 
intrastate non-economic activity if failure to regulate the activity would undercut Congress’s 
regulatory scheme); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 (holding Congress can regulate intrastate 
economic activity that substantially affects commerce); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (“[A]cts[, even intrastate acts,] which directly burden or 
obstruct interstate or foreign commerce . . . are within the reach of the congressional 
power.”); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895) (limiting Congress’s 
power to the regulation of commerce between the states or with foreign nations).  
 151. See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125-28; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (approving Congress’s reliance on the Commerce Clause to 
regulate hotels and ban racial discrimination).  
 152. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.  
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The Lopez Court was tasked with determining whether the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act, which prohibited possession of a fire arm in a school 
zone, was outside the parameters of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
powers.153 In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist took the 
opportunity to place limitations on Congress’s power. One limitation 
required that the statute’s regulatory scheme must have a substantial 
relationship to commerce.154 The Court relied on its prior recognition of 
three classifications of activities that Congress may regulate under its 
Commerce Clause powers. These three classifications included channels of, 
instrumentalities of, and activities substantially affecting interstate 
commerce.155 Although the Court failed to specifically define each 
classification, this classification system has become vitally important to an 
analysis of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.  
Whether or not an activity is a channel, instrumentality, or a substantial 
effect of interstate commerce determines Congress’s power to regulate that 
activity. In Lopez, the Supreme Court intimated differing levels of 
congressional power based on the classification of an activity. For example, 
the Court provided that Congress may regulate instrumentalities of 
intrastate commerce, “even though the threat may come only from interstate 
activities.”156 However, the Court did not grant the same qualification to 
channels, merely stating that Congress may regulate channels of interstate 
commerce.157 Aptly stated by Nathaniel Clark, this difference suggests 
Congress only has the power to regulate channels when the activity occurs 
in interstate commerce.158 Therefore, one can assume Congress has more 
power to regulate instrumentalities of interstate commerce than it does 
channels.  
Further, when the Lopez Court stated that Congress has the power to 
regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, the Court 
cited NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.159 as support for its holding.160 
The Court in Jones & Laughlin Steel stated that Congress has the power to 
regulate activities which substantially affect interstate commerce, even 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Id. at 551.  
 154. Id. at 558.  
 155. Id. at 558-59. 
 156. Id. at 558.  
 157. Id.  
 158. Clark, supra note 4, at 955.  
 159. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).  
 160. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. 
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activities that occur wholly intrastate.161 Activities which substantially 
affect commerce arguably give Congress its greatest power to regulate 
interstate commerce. This is because Congress may regulate any activity 
that substantially affects commerce, including channels and 
instrumentalities. Therefore, the classification of particular activity has a 
major impact on the level of power Congress has to regulate that activity. 
As a result, the classification of Internet use is vitally important in 
determining Congress’s power to regulate the Internet. 
B. Channels, Instruments, and Effects, Oh My! 
The classification of Internet use has become the subject of debate in the 
legal community. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never defined 
these terms specifically, which means that any scholarship based on 
classifications is based on district and circuit court opinions, as well as 
other legal writers. Based on an analysis of legal scholarship and circuit 
court definitions, this Note posits that the Internet constitutes a channel and 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, and it substantially affects interstate 
commerce.  
“[A] channel of interstate commerce is a path, route, or course that 
commerce may flow or move through.”162 In Tangled in a Web: The 
Difficulty of Regulating Intrastate Internet Transmissions Under the 
Interstate Commerce Clause,163 Nathaniel Clark analyzed three Supreme 
Court cases and described a channel as “rivers, roads and railways.”164 The 
Internet is equivalent to a river, road, and railway because it is the means 
which one uses to “travel” in interstate commerce, and this is supported by 
opinions from the Third and Eleventh Circuits, each of which held the 
Internet is a channel (and instrumentality) of interstate commerce.165 
Therefore, the Internet is a channel of interstate commerce. 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 36-37.  
 162. Jonathan R. Gray, Comment, United States v. Schaefer and United States v. Sturm: 
Why the Federal Government Should Regulate All Internet Use as Interstate Commerce, 90 
DENV. U.L. REV. 691, 699 (2012). 
 163. Clark, supra note 4, at 954-55.  
 164. Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 271 (1964) 
(standing for the assertion that highways are treated differently from instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917) (holding a 
statute regulating railroads as within the power of Congress); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1, 1-2 (1824) (holding navigable waterways as within the power of Congress).  
 165. United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004).  
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Next, unlike the seemingly unified definition of a channel, the definitions 
of an instrumentality are more diverse. One article quotes Black’s Law 
Dictionary, and states an instrumentality is a “‘thing used to achieve an end 
or purpose.’”166 Further, Professor Michele Campbell argues the Internet is 
an instrumentality of interstate commerce, basing her conclusion on the fact 
that numerous lower courts have so found, and that no federal court 
addressing the question has found that the Internet is not an 
instrumentality.167 However, if rivers, roads, and railways are channels of 
interstate commerce, then instrumentality could also be described as a 
vehicle of interstate commerce, such as a car or an airplane.168 Regardless, 
the Internet can easily be described as a “thing used to achieve an end or 
purpose,”169 because one must use the Internet to achieve an end, for 
example, to send an email. In addition, the weight of case law supports this 
conclusion.170 Therefore, the Internet is also an instrumentality of interstate 
commerce. 
Finally, Internet use substantially affects interstate commerce. Unlike 
channels and instrumentalities, the types of activities that result in a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce are better defined. In United 
States v. Lopez, the Court stated that Congress may regulate when an 
“economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce.”171 However, 
the Court restricted the substantial-effects classification to activities that 
actually substantially affected interstate commerce, not activities that 
simply affected or had a “trivial impact” on commerce.172 For example, in 
his article, Cody Stafford analyzed whether the Internet, as it pertains to the 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Gray, supra note 164, at 699 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 264 (9th ed. 
2009)).  
 167. Michele Martinez Campbell, The Kids Are Online: The Internet, the Commerce 
Clause, and the Amended Federal Kidnapping Act, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 215, 243 (2011); 
see also MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 245 (holding the Internet is a channel and instrumentality of 
interstate commerce); Hornaday, 392 F.3d at 1311 (same).  
 168. Clark, supra note 4, at 958 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) 
(noting aircraft are instrumentalities of interstate commerce); S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 
222 U.S. 20, 25 (1911) (distinguishing vehicles from highways of interstate commerce and 
noting vehicles may be regulated for intra or interstate travel)). 
 169. Gray, supra note 164, at 699 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (9th ed. 2009)). 
 170. See, e.g., United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 952-53 (9th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 920-21 (8th Cir. 2007); MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 245.  
 171. 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995). 
 172. Id. at 559.  
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child pornography statutes, substantially affects commerce.173 In concluding 
the use of the Internet under the child pornography statutes substantially 
affect interstate commerce, Stafford focused on a variety of factors.174 For 
example, child pornography’s status as a major industry tied it to interstate 
commerce.175 In addition, the finding that the statute contained a 
jurisdictional nexus that would otherwise limit Congress’s power served as 
a safeguard against congressional overreach.176  
Child pornography statues are not the only statutes under which the 
Internet would substantially affect commerce. Internet use for the 
commission of wire fraud, for example, would substantially affect interstate 
commerce. In 2009, the Internet Crime Complaint Center reported that it 
received 336,655 complaints with a total of $559.7 million in losses,177 
suggesting that wire fraud is a major “industry.” Further, the wire fraud 
statute contains an Interstate Nexus requirement that would otherwise limit 
congressional power to regulate. Finally, Gonzales v. Raich states that 
activities that undercut a federal regulatory scheme are activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.178 Therefore, use of the Internet in 
the commission of a crime, specifically in the commission of wire fraud, 
substantially affects interstate commerce because it undercuts the federal 
scheme that regulates illegal conduct over the “wires.”179 
Classifying the Internet as a channel, instrumentality, and/or activity 
substantially affecting interstate commerce may seem tedious, but the 
classification of the Internet plays a large role in proposing a new standard 
of applying the use of the Internet to interstate commerce. One current trend 
is to propose a standard that would either allow Congress to regulate the 
Internet as a channel,180 or allow Congress to regulate Internet use as an 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Cody W. Stafford, Note, Substantial Effect: What United States v. Schaefer Reveals 
about Congress’s Power to Regulate Local Activity Under the Commerce Clause, 62 
BAYLOR L. REV. 290 (2010).  
 174. Id. at 309-10; see also Gray, supra note 162, at 704-06 (concluding that, as applied 
to the child pornography statutes, the Internet substantially affects interstate commerce based 
on the same analysis). 
 175. See Stafford, supra note 174, at 309; Gray, supra note 162, at 704-06. 
 176. See Stafford, supra note 174, at 309; Gray, supra note 162, at 704-06. 
 177. IC3 2009 Annual Report on Internet Crime Released, INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT 
CTR. (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.ic3.gov/media/2010/100312.aspx.  
 178. 545 U.S. 1, 17-19 (2005) (holding activities that undercut a federal regulatory 
scheme of conduct substantially affect interstate commerce). 
 179. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). 
 180. See Casey O’Connor, Comment, Cutting Cyberstalking’s Gordian Knot: A Simple 
and Unified Statutory Approach, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1007, 1035-36 (2013). 
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activity that substantially affects interstate commerce,181 and as we have 
seen, one’s classification of the internet dramatically impacts Congress’s 
power to regulate.  
C. The Problem with Channels and Effects 
The need for a uniform standard of applying interstate commerce 
requirements of federal criminal statutes to the Internet has not gone 
unnoticed. In fact, several pieces have contributed to solving the problem at 
hand, but there is one problem. Most of these standards propose to regulate 
the Internet as either a channel of interstate commerce, or as an activity 
substantially affecting interstate commerce.182 However, regulating the 
Internet as a channel of interstate commerce requires that the government 
must show an Internet transmission or communication crossed state lines in 
order to prosecute, and therefore limits federal jurisdiction over crimes.183 
On the other hand, regulating the Internet as substantial affecting interstate 
commerce allows Congress to regulate interstate, as well as intrastate, 
activities with its full Commerce Clause powers,184 which places too much 
power in the hands of Congress and could deny a state its right to 
prosecute.185  
Both of the standards above advocate for what is, effectively, an all-or-
nothing approach to regulating the Internet, and it is this type of approach 
that creates such polarized concerns in both camps. Further, neither extreme 
is entirely fair because, as seen, the approaches either deny the federal 
government the power it should have to prosecute, or deny the states their 
police power by giving the federal government too much power. So what 
                                                                                                                 
 181. See David M. Frommell, Survey, Pedophiles, Politics, and the Balance of Power: 
The Fallout from United States v. Schaefer and the Erosion of State Authority, 86 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 1155, 1176 (2009). 
 182. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 4, at 967-68 (stating the Internet should be regulated as a 
channel of interstate commerce, unless the conduct substantially affects interstate 
commerce); Gray, supra note 162, at 706-07 (stating the Internet should be regulated as an 
activity substantially affecting interstate commerce).  
 183. Campbell, supra note 167, at 257; Gray, supra note 162, at 708, 713; O’Connor, 
supra note 180, at 1035-36; Ryan K. Stumphauzer, Note, Electronic Impulses, Digital 
Signals, and Federal Jurisdiction: Congress’s Commerce Clause Power in the Twenty-First 
Century, 56 VAND. L. REV. 277, 318 (2003); see also Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, 
Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1, 3-5 (2012). 
 184. See supra Part IV.A. 
 185. Campbell, supra note 167, at 252; Clark, supra note 4, at 969; Frommell, supra note 
181, at 1176; Stumphauzer, supra note 183, at 301-02; see also Jesse H. Choper, Taming 
Congress’s Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 
ARK. L. REV. 731, 758 (2003).  
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must we do? The best answer, and the standard that resolves most of the 
concerns of both sides, is one that advocates for a middle ground. That is, a 
standard that honors the federal government’s right to regulate commerce 
and prosecute criminals for federal crimes while also honoring the states 
and their rights as police powers. 
D. Stuck in the Middle: A New Standard of Applying Federal Criminal 
Statutes to the Internet 
The goal of this Note is to create a uniform standard that could be used to 
interstate-commerce requirements of criminal statutes to the Internet. This 
standard strikes a balance between the two alternatives above by allowing 
the federal government sufficient latitude to adequately prosecute crimes 
perpetrated through the Internet, while making sure the federal government 
does not become too powerful and interfere with the states’ rights to 
prosecute local crimes. By regulating the Internet as substantially affecting 
interstate commerce, the standard ensures the government has the authority 
to prosecute intrastate crimes. However, instead of allowing the 
government to use its power to regulate activities, particularly non-
economic intrastate activities which have no effect on interstate commerce, 
this standard implements a test borrowed from NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp.186 to ensure the federal government does not coopt the states 
police power.  
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Supreme Court determined whether an act 
by the NLRB was within the bounds of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
powers. As its first step, the Court defined the Act’s Interstate Nexus 
phrase, “affecting commerce”, as “mean[ing] in commerce, or burdening or 
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.”187 The Court 
reaffirmed the holding that acts which fell within that definition were 
within the reach of Congress’s commerce power.188 However, the Court 
also acknowledged that, while the NLRB may have the power to regulate in 
that instance, the federal government’s authority must not be pushed to such 
excess that it destroyed distinction between interstate commerce and the 
“internal concerns of a [s]tate.”189 To protect against the possibility of the 
federal government’s authority overrunning a state, the Court established a 
new rule. The Court held that a determination of whether or not a particular 
action closely and intimately (substantially) affects commerce such that it is 
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subject to federal control must be made on a case by case basis,190 and this 
decision has been upheld numerous times since then.191  
Therefore, although the proposed standard would regulate the Internet as 
substantially affecting interstate commerce, whether or not the Internet 
activity substantially affected interstate commerce must be determined in 
each case. Making this determination in each case balances the substantial 
grant of power to the federal government by allowing it to regulating the 
Internet as substantially affecting interstate commerce. In practice, this 
standard would allow the federal government to regulate both interstate and 
intrastate activities only if the court finds the activity substantially affects 
interstate commerce. 
In determining whether or not an Internet activity substantially affects 
interstate commerce, there are several factors that courts may consider, and 
these factors are generally based on whether the activity is interstate or 
intrastate in nature. For example, the mere fact that an activity is interstate 
in nature should be sufficient to show that it substantially affects interstate 
commerce. The process becomes more complicated, however, when the 
activity occurs intrastate. The Jones & Laughlin Steel Court stated that the 
government could regulate intrastate activities if the activities had a close 
and substantial relationship to interstate commerce such that federal control 
would be essential or appropriate to protect commerce.192 Although neither 
the Supreme Court, nor any court since, has specifically identified factors 
that would determine whether an intrastate activity had a close and 
substantial relationship to commerce, there are several that can be inferred 
from case law which the courts could use to make such a determination: (1) 
does the intrastate activity amount to more or less constant practice and 
threaten to obstruct or unduly burden interstate commerce,193 (2) is the 
activity related to a productive industry,194 (3) is the activity a 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Id. at 32.  
 191. See Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 213-14 (1938); NLRB v. 
Benevento, 297 F.2d 873, 875 (1st Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co., 91 
F.2d 790, 795-96 (9th Cir. 1937); Taft, Ingalls & Co. v. Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs & 
Helpers Local Union No. 100, 202 F. Supp. 317, 318 (S.D. Ohio 1962); see also Campbell, 
supra note 167, at 259-60 (citing the modified Federal Kidnapping Act which requires the 
trial court to access the strength of the federal interest in the prosecution by determining 
whether the facts as alleged establish a sufficient nexus between the defendant’s conduct and 
interstate commerce). 
 192. 301 U.S. at 37.  
 193. Id. 
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communication of a business nature,195 and (4) does the activity exert a 
substantial economic effect.196 Of course, these factors are neither 
exhaustive, nor are they dispositive, but they could provide a court a 
framework with which to make its determination.  
Finally, this standard is similar to the uniform standard proposed by 
Ryan Stumphauzer in his article, Electronic Impulses, Digital Signals, and 
Federal Jurisdiction: Congress’s Commerce Clause Power in the Twenty-
First Century.197 In the article, Stumphauzer proposes eliminating the Lopez 
classifications (channel, instrument, substantial affect) and implementing a 
standard which would allow Congress to regulate economic activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.198 In addition, Stumphauzer’s 
proposal would allow the government to regulate non-economic activities 
as long as the activity substantially affected interstate commerce.199  
In spite of the similarities between these standards, there are three 
notable differences. First, this standard would only apply to the regulation 
of the Internet as it pertains to federal criminal statutes, whereas 
Stumphauzer’s applies to the entirety of the Commerce Clause. Second, this 
standard requires a court to make a determination in every case that the 
activity substantially affects commerce, not merely in instances where the 
activity is non-economic. Finally, this proposal would not eliminate the 
Lopez classifications because they are useful in regulating activities that do 
not involve the Internet. However, one key feature of both proposed 
standards is they balance power between the federal government and the 
states, which is the best and fairest method of regulating commerce. 
While no uniform standard which proposes to apply interstate commerce 
to the use of the Internet will be perfect, this standard avoids the problems 
that present themselves when one tries to choose between the powers of the 
federal government and the states. In addition, this new standard provides 
for a uniform application of interstate commerce requirements of federal 
criminal statutes to the Internet. The legal community, as well as all future 
defendants, needs a uniform standard of application, especially in light of 
the vastly differing judicial applications discussed in this Note. A uniform 
standard provides consistent prosecutions and court opinions, informed 
defendants and prosecutors, and satisfied lawyers who no longer have to 
guess whether or not they should prove that an Internet connection crossed 
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state lines. For all of these reasons and more, Congress and the Supreme 
Court should act, and this Note offers a suggested standard which they 
could apply.  
VII. Conclusion 
The inconsistencies present in judicial application of use the Internet to 
interstate commerce have never been more present than in the Tenth 
Circuit’s United States v. Kieffer. When viewed within the aggregate of 
cases to address the Internet and interstate commerce, the need for a 
uniform standard that courts can apply to criminal statutes becomes clear. 
The best standard is one that honors both Congress’s Commerce Clause 
powers and the states’ police power, and this Note’s standard accomplishes 
both of those tasks. However, proposed standards are useless without action 
by Congress or the Supreme Court, and it is critical they act. The Internet 
permeates all aspects of life, including the ways in which we commit 
crimes. It is no longer an option to “wait and see” what happens to the 
Internet in a few years. We must acknowledge this and enact a scheme that 
uniformly and fairly enforces crimes committed via the Internet—let’s 
reinvent the wheel. 
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